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s3_srvr.c

/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
 *
 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
 *
 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
 * license provided above.
 *
 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
 *
 */

#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG

#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>

static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
#endif

static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
      {
      if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
            return(SSLv3_server_method());
      else
            return(NULL);
      }

IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
                  ssl3_accept,
                  ssl_undefined_function,
                  ssl3_get_server_method)

int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
      {
      BUF_MEM *buf;
      unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
      void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
      int ret= -1;
      int new_state,state,skip=0;

      RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
      ERR_clear_error();
      clear_sys_error();

      if (s->info_callback != NULL)
            cb=s->info_callback;
      else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
            cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

      /* init things to blank */
      s->in_handshake++;
      if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);

      if (s->cert == NULL)
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
            return(-1);
            }

      for (;;)
            {
            state=s->state;

            switch (s->state)
                  {
            case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
                  s->new_session=1;
                  /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */

            case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
            case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
            case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
            case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:

                  s->server=1;
                  if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);

                  if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return -1;
                        }
                  s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;

                  if (s->init_buf == NULL)
                        {
                        if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
                              {
                              ret= -1;
                              goto end;
                              }
                        if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
                              {
                              ret= -1;
                              goto end;
                              }
                        s->init_buf=buf;
                        }

                  if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
                        {
                        ret= -1;
                        goto end;
                        }

                  s->init_num=0;

                  if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
                        {
                        /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
                         * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
                         */
                        if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
                        
                        ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
                        s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
                        }
                  else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
                        !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
                        {
                        /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
                         * client that doesn't support secure
                         * renegotiation.
                         */
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
                        ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                        ret = -1;
                        goto end;
                        }
                  else
                        {
                        /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
                         * we will just send a HelloRequest */
                        s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
                        }
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:

                  s->shutdown=0;
                  ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
                  s->init_num=0;

                  ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
                  s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
            case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:

                  s->shutdown=0;
                  ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                  s->new_session = 2;
                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
                  ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                  if (s->hit)
                        {
                        if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
                              s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
                        else
                              s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
                        }
#else
                  if (s->hit)
                              s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
                  else
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
                  /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
                  if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
                        && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
                        {
                        ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                        if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
                              s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
                        else
                              s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
                        }
                  else
                        {
                        skip = 1;
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
                        }
#else
                        }
                  else
                        skip=1;

                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
                  l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;

                  /* clear this, it may get reset by
                   * send_server_key_exchange */
                  if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
                        && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
                        )
                        /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
                         * even when forbidden by protocol specs
                         * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
                         * be able to handle this) */
                        s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
                  else
                        s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;


                  /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
                   * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
                   *
                   * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
                   * message only if the cipher suite is either
                   * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
                   * server certificate contains the server's 
                   * public key for key exchange.
                   */
                  if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
                      || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
                      || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
                      || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
                        && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
                            || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
                              && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
                              )
                            )
                        )
                      )
                        {
                        ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                        }
                  else
                        skip=1;

                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
                  if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
                        !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
                        /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
                         * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
                        ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
                         (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
                        /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
                         * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
                         * and in RFC 2246): */
                        ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
                         /* ... except when the application insists on verification
                          * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
                         !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
                                 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
                                (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
                        {
                        /* no cert request */
                        skip=1;
                        s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
                        }
                  else
                        {
                        s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
                        ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
                        s->init_num=0;
                        }
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
                  ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                  s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;
            
            case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:

                  /* This code originally checked to see if
                   * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
                   * and then flushed. This caused problems
                   * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
                   * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
                   * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
                   * still exist. So instead we just flush
                   * unconditionally.
                   */

                  s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
                  if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
                        {
                        ret= -1;
                        goto end;
                        }
                  s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

                  s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
                  /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
                  ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
                  if (ret <= 0)
                        goto end;
                  if (ret == 2)
                        s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
                  else {
                        if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
                              {
                              ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
                              if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                              }
                        s->init_num=0;
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
                  }
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
                  ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
                  if (ret <= 0) 
                        goto end;
                  if (ret == 2)
                        {
                        /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
                         * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
                         * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
                         * message is not sent.
                         */
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
                        s->init_num = 0;
                        }
                  else   
                        {
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
                        s->init_num=0;

                        /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
                         * a client cert, it can be verified
                         */ 
                        s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
                            &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
                            &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
                        s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
                            &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
                            &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
                        }
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:

                  /* we should decide if we expected this one */
                  ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;

                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
                  ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
                        SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                  if (s->hit)
                        s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                  else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
                  else
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
            case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
                  ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
                  ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

#endif

            case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:

                  s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
                  if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
                        { ret= -1; goto end; }

                  ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
                        SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);

                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
                  s->init_num=0;

                  if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
                        SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
                        {
                        ret= -1;
                        goto end;
                        }

                  break;

            case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
            case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
                  ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
                        SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
                        s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
                        s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
                  if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                  s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
                  if (s->hit)
                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
                  else
                        s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
                  s->init_num=0;
                  break;

            case SSL_ST_OK:
                  /* clean a few things up */
                  ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);

                  BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
                  s->init_buf=NULL;

                  /* remove buffering on output */
                  ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);

                  s->init_num=0;

                  if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
                        {
                        /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
                         * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
                        
                        s->new_session=0;
                        
                        ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
                        
                        s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
                        /* s->server=1; */
                        s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;

                        if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
                        }
                  
                  ret = 1;
                  goto end;
                  /* break; */

            default:
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
                  ret= -1;
                  goto end;
                  /* break; */
                  }
            
            if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
                  {
                  if (s->debug)
                        {
                        if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
                              goto end;
                        }


                  if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
                        {
                        new_state=s->state;
                        s->state=state;
                        cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
                        s->state=new_state;
                        }
                  }
            skip=0;
            }
end:
      /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */

      s->in_handshake--;
      if (cb != NULL)
            cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
      return(ret);
      }

int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
      {
      unsigned char *p;

      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
            {
            p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
            *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
            *(p++)=0;
            *(p++)=0;
            *(p++)=0;

            s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
            /* number of bytes to write */
            s->init_num=4;
            s->init_off=0;
            }

      /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
      return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
      }

int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
      {
      int ok;
      long n;

      /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
       * so permit appropriate message length */
      n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
            SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
            SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
            -1,
            s->max_cert_list,
            &ok);
      if (!ok) return((int)n);
      s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
            {
            /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
             * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
             * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
             * when a handshake is not completed ... */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
            if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
                  {
                  DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
                  s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
                  }
#endif
            return 2;
            }
      return 1;
}

int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
      {
      int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
      unsigned int cookie_len;
      long n;
      unsigned long id;
      unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
      SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
#endif
      STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;

      /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
       * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
       * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
       * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
       * TLSv1.
       */
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
            {
            s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
            }
      s->first_packet=1;
      n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
            SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
            SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
            SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
            SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
            &ok);

      if (!ok) return((int)n);
      s->first_packet=0;
      d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

      /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
       * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
      s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
      p+=2;

      if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
          (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
            if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 
                  {
                  /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
                  s->version = s->client_version;
                  }
            al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
            goto f_err;
            }

      /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
       * contain one, just return since we do not want to
       * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
       */
      if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
            {
            unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
            
            session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
            cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);

            if (cookie_length == 0)
                  return 1;
            }

      /* load the client random */
      memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
      p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

      /* get the session-id */
      j= *(p++);

      s->hit=0;
      /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
       * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
       * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
       * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
       * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
       * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
       * an earlier library version)
       */
      if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
            {
            if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
                  goto err;
            }
      else
            {
            i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
            if (i == 1)
                  { /* previous session */
                  s->hit=1;
                  }
            else if (i == -1)
                  goto err;
            else /* i == 0 */
                  {
                  if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
                        goto err;
                  }
            }

      p+=j;

      if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
            {
            /* cookie stuff */
            cookie_len = *(p++);

            /* 
             * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
             * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
             * does not cause an overflow.
             */
            if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
                  {
                  /* too much data */
                  al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
                  goto f_err;
                  }

            /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
            if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
                  cookie_len > 0)
                  {
                  memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);

                  if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
                        {
                        if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
                              cookie_len) == 0)
                              {
                              al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 
                                    SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
                              goto f_err;
                              }
                        /* else cookie verification succeeded */
                        }
                  else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 
                                      s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
                        {
                              al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 
                                    SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
                              goto f_err;
                        }

                  ret = 2;
                  }

            p += cookie_len;
            }

      n2s(p,i);
      if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
            {
            /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
            al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
            goto f_err;
            }
      if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
            {
            /* not enough data */
            al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
            goto f_err;
            }
      if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
            == NULL))
            {
            goto err;
            }
      p+=i;

      /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
      if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
            {
            j=0;
            id=s->session->cipher->id;

#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
            printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
#endif
            for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
                  {
                  c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
                  printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
                        i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
                  if (c->id == id)
                        {
                        j=1;
                        break;
                        }
                  }
            if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
                  {
                  /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
                   * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
                   * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
                   * preferences.  We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
                   * enabled, though. */
                  c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
                  if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
                        {
                        s->session->cipher = c;
                        j = 1;
                        }
                  }
            if (j == 0)
                  {
                  /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
                   * list if we are asked to reuse it */
                  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }

      /* compression */
      i= *(p++);
      if ((p+i) > (d+n))
            {
            /* not enough data */
            al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
            goto f_err;
            }
      q=p;
      for (j=0; j<i; j++)
            {
            if (p[j] == 0) break;
            }

      p+=i;
      if (j >= i)
            {
            /* no compress */
            al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
            goto f_err;
            }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
      /* TLS extensions*/
      if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
            {
            if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
                  {
                  /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }
            if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
                  goto err;
            }
#endif
      /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
       * options, we will now look for them.  We have i-1 compression
       * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
      s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
            { /* See if we have a match */
            int m,nn,o,v,done=0;

            nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
            for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
                  {
                  comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
                  v=comp->id;
                  for (o=0; o<i; o++)
                        {
                        if (v == q[o])
                              {
                              done=1;
                              break;
                              }
                        }
                  if (done) break;
                  }
            if (done)
                  s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
            else
                  comp=NULL;
            }
#endif

      /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
#if 0   /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
         * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
         * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
      if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
            {
            if (p < (d+n))
                  {
                  /* wrong number of bytes,
                   * there could be more to follow */
                  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }
#endif

      /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
       * pick a cipher */

      if (!s->hit)
            {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
            s->session->compress_meth=0;
#else
            s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
#endif
            if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
                  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
            s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
            if (ciphers == NULL)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            ciphers=NULL;
            c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
                             SSL_get_ciphers(s));

            if (c == NULL)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
            }
      else
            {
            /* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
            STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
            SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
            SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;

            if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
                  {
                  sk=s->session->ciphers;
                  for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
                        {
                        c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
                        if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
                              nc=c;
                        if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
                              ec=c;
                        }
                  if (nc != NULL)
                        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
                  else if (ec != NULL)
                        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
                  else
                        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
                  }
            else
#endif
            s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
            }
      
      /* we now have the following setup. 
       * client_random
       * cipher_list          - our prefered list of ciphers
       * ciphers        - the clients prefered list of ciphers
       * compression          - basically ignored right now
       * ssl version is set   - sslv3
       * s->session           - The ssl session has been setup.
       * s->hit         - session reuse flag
       * s->tmp.new_cipher    - the new cipher to use.
       */

      if (ret < 0) ret=1;
      if (0)
            {
f_err:
            ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
            }
err:
      if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
      return(ret);
      }

int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
      {
      unsigned char *buf;
      unsigned char *p,*d;
      int i,sl;
      unsigned long l,Time;

      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
            {
            buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
            p=s->s3->server_random;
            Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);                 /* Time */
            l2n(Time,p);
            if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
                  return -1;
            /* Do the message type and length last */
            d=p= &(buf[4]);

            *(p++)=s->version>>8;
            *(p++)=s->version&0xff;

            /* Random stuff */
            memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
            p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

            /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
             * session id.  If it is a re-use, we send back the
             * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
             * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
             * session-id if we want it to be single use.
             * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
             * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
             *
             * We also have an additional case where stateless session
             * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
             * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
             * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
             * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
             * is unaffected.
             */
            if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
                  && !s->hit)
                  s->session->session_id_length=0;

            sl=s->session->session_id_length;
            if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  return -1;
                  }
            *(p++)=sl;
            memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
            p+=sl;

            /* put the cipher */
            i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
            p+=i;

            /* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
                  *(p++)=0;
#else
            if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
                  *(p++)=0;
            else
                  *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
            if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  return -1;
                  }
#endif
            /* do the header */
            l=(p-d);
            d=buf;
            *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
            l2n3(l,d);

            s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
            /* number of bytes to write */
            s->init_num=p-buf;
            s->init_off=0;
            }

      /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
      return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
      }

int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
      {
      unsigned char *p;

      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
            {
            p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

            /* do the header */
            *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
            *(p++)=0;
            *(p++)=0;
            *(p++)=0;

            s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
            /* number of bytes to write */
            s->init_num=4;
            s->init_off=0;
            }

      /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
      return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
      }

int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
      {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      unsigned char *q;
      int j,num;
      RSA *rsa;
      unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
      unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
      DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
      unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
      int encodedlen = 0;
      int curve_id = 0;
      BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
#endif
      EVP_PKEY *pkey;
      unsigned char *p,*d;
      int al,i;
      unsigned long type;
      int n;
      CERT *cert;
      BIGNUM *r[4];
      int nr[4],kn;
      BUF_MEM *buf;
      EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;

      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
            {
            type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
            cert=s->cert;

            buf=s->init_buf;

            r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
            n=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
            if (type & SSL_kRSA)
                  {
                  rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
                  if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
                        {
                        rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
                              SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
                              SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
                        if(rsa == NULL)
                        {
                              al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
                              goto f_err;
                        }
                        RSA_up_ref(rsa);
                        cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
                        }
                  if (rsa == NULL)
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                  r[0]=rsa->n;
                  r[1]=rsa->e;
                  s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
                  }
            else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
                  if (type & SSL_kEDH)
                  {
                  dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
                  if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
                        dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
                              SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
                              SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
                  if (dhp == NULL)
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
                        goto f_err;
                        }

                  if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
                        {
                        DH_free(dh);
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        goto err;
                        }

                  if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }

                  s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
                  if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
                       dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
                       (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
                        {
                        if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
                            {
                            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
                            goto err;
                            }
                        }
                  else
                        {
                        dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
                        dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
                        if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
                              (dh->priv_key == NULL))
                              {
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
                              goto err;
                              }
                        }
                  r[0]=dh->p;
                  r[1]=dh->g;
                  r[2]=dh->pub_key;
                  }
            else 
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
                  if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
                  {
                  const EC_GROUP *group;

                  ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
                  if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
                        {
                        ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
                              SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
                              SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
                        }
                  if (ecdhp == NULL)
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
                        goto f_err;
                        }

                  if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
                        {
                        EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        goto err;
                        }

                  /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
                  if (ecdhp == NULL)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }
                  if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }
                  ecdh = ecdhp;

                  s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
                  if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
                      (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
                      (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
                        {
                        if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
                            {
                            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                            goto err;
                            }
                        }

                  if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
                      (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
                      (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }

                  if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
                      (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
                        goto err;
                        }

                  /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
                   * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 
                   * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
                   */
                  if ((curve_id = 
                      nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
                      == 0)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
                        goto err;
                        }

                  /* Encode the public key.
                   * First check the size of encoding and
                   * allocate memory accordingly.
                   */
                  encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
                      EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
                      POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
                      NULL, 0, NULL);

                  encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
                      OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 
                  bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
                  if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                        goto err;
                        }


                  encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 
                      EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 
                      POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
                      encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);

                  if (encodedlen == 0) 
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }

                  BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);  bn_ctx=NULL;

                  /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 
                   * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
                   * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
                   * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
                   * structure. 
                   */
                  n = 4 + encodedlen;

                  /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
                   * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
                   */
                  r[0]=NULL;
                  r[1]=NULL;
                  r[2]=NULL;
                  r[3]=NULL;
                  }
            else 
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
                  {
                  nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
                  n+=2+nr[i];
                  }

            if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
                  {
                  if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
                        == NULL)
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                  kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
                  }
            else
                  {
                  pkey=NULL;
                  kn=0;
                  }

            if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
                  goto err;
                  }
            d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
            p= &(d[4]);

            for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
                  {
                  s2n(nr[i],p);
                  BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
                  p+=nr[i];
                  }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
            if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 
                  {
                  /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
                   * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
                   * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
                   * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
                   * the actual encoded point itself
                   */
                  *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
                  p += 1;
                  *p = 0;
                  p += 1;
                  *p = curve_id;
                  p += 1;
                  *p = encodedlen;
                  p += 1;
                  memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 
                      (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
                      encodedlen);
                  OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
                  p += encodedlen;
                  }
#endif

            /* not anonymous */
            if (pkey != NULL)
                  {
                  /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
                   * and p points to the space at the end. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
                  if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
                        {
                        q=md_buf;
                        j=0;
                        for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
                              {
                              EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
                                    EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
                              EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
                                    ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
                              EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                              EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                              EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
                              EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
                                    (unsigned int *)&i);
                              q+=i;
                              j+=i;
                              }
                        if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
                              &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
                              {
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
                              goto err;
                              }
                        s2n(u,p);
                        n+=u+2;
                        }
                  else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
                        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
                        {
                        /* lets do DSS */
                        EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
                        EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                        EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                        EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
                        if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
                              (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
                              {
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
                              goto err;
                              }
                        s2n(i,p);
                        n+=i+2;
                        }
                  else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
                        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
                        {
                        /* let's do ECDSA */
                        EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
                        EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                        EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                        EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
                        if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
                              (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
                              {
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
                              goto err;
                              }
                        s2n(i,p);
                        n+=i+2;
                        }
                  else
#endif
                        {
                        /* Is this error check actually needed? */
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                  }

            *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
            l2n3(n,d);

            /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
             * it off */
            s->init_num=n+4;
            s->init_off=0;
            }

      s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
      return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
      BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
      return(-1);
      }

int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
      {
      unsigned char *p,*d;
      int i,j,nl,off,n;
      STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
      X509_NAME *name;
      BUF_MEM *buf;

      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
            {
            buf=s->init_buf;

            d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);

            /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
            p++;
            n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
            d[0]=n;
            p+=n;
            n++;

            off=n;
            p+=2;
            n+=2;

            sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
            nl=0;
            if (sk != NULL)
                  {
                  for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
                        {
                        name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
                        j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
                        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
                              {
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
                              goto err;
                              }
                        p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
                        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
                              {
                              s2n(j,p);
                              i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
                              n+=2+j;
                              nl+=2+j;
                              }
                        else
                              {
                              d=p;
                              i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
                              j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
                              n+=j;
                              nl+=j;
                              }
                        }
                  }
            /* else no CA names */
            p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
            s2n(nl,p);

            d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
            *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
            l2n3(n,d);

            /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
             * it off */

            s->init_num=n+4;
            s->init_off=0;
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
            p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;

            /* do the header */
            *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
            *(p++)=0;
            *(p++)=0;
            *(p++)=0;
            s->init_num += 4;
#endif

            s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
            }

      /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
      return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
      return(-1);
      }

int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
      {
      int i,al,ok;
      long n;
      unsigned long l;
      unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      RSA *rsa=NULL;
      EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
      BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
      DH *dh_srvr;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
        KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
      EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
      EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
      BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
#endif

      n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
            SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
            SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
            SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
            2048, /* ??? */
            &ok);

      if (!ok) return((int)n);
      p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

      l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
      if (l & SSL_kRSA)
            {
            /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
            if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
                  {
                  if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
                        rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
                  /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
                   * be sent already */
                  if (rsa == NULL)
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
                        goto f_err;

                        }
                  }
            else
                  {
                  pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
                  if (  (pkey == NULL) ||
                        (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
                        (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                  rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
                  }

            /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
            if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
                s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                  {
                  n2s(p,i);
                  if (n != i+2)
                        {
                        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
                              {
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
                              goto err;
                              }
                        else
                              p-=2;
                        }
                  else
                        n=i;
                  }

            i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);

            al = -1;
            
            if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                  /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
                  }

            if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
                  {
                  /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
                   * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
                   * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
                   * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
                   * version instead if the server does not support the requested
                   * protocol version.
                   * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
                  if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
                        (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                        /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */

                        /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
                         * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
                         * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
                         * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
                         * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
                         * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
                         * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
                        }
                  }

            if (al != -1)
                  {
                  /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
                   * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
                   * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
                  ERR_clear_error();
                  i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
                  p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
                  p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
                  if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
                        goto err;
                  }
      
            s->session->master_key_length=
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                        s->session->master_key,
                        p,i);
            OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
            }
      else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
            if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
            {
            n2s(p,i);
            if (n != i+2)
                  {
                  if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
                        goto err;
                        }
                  else
                        {
                        p-=2;
                        i=(int)n;
                        }
                  }

            if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            else
                  {
                  if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                  else
                        dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
                  }

            pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
            if (pub == NULL)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
                  goto err;
                  }

            i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);

            if (i <= 0)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
                  goto err;
                  }

            DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
            s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;

            BN_clear_free(pub);
            pub=NULL;
            s->session->master_key_length=
                  s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                        s->session->master_key,p,i);
            OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
            }
      else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
        if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
                {
                krb5_error_code           krb5rc;
            krb5_data         enc_ticket;
            krb5_data         authenticator;
            krb5_data         enc_pms;
                KSSL_CTX            *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX          ciph_ctx;
            EVP_CIPHER        *enc = NULL;
            unsigned char           iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
            unsigned char           pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
                                               + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
            int                     padl, outl;
            krb5_timestamp          authtime = 0;
            krb5_ticket_times ttimes;

            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);

                if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();

            n2s(p,i);
            enc_ticket.length = i;

            if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto err;
                  }

            enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
            p+=enc_ticket.length;

            n2s(p,i);
            authenticator.length = i;

            if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto err;
                  }

            authenticator.data = (char *)p;
            p+=authenticator.length;

            n2s(p,i);
            enc_pms.length = i;
            enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
            p+=enc_pms.length;

            /* Note that the length is checked again below,
            ** after decryption
            */
            if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto err;
                  }

            if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
                                    enc_pms.length + 6))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto err;
                  }

                if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
                              &kssl_err)) != 0)
                        {
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                        printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
                                krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
                        if (kssl_err.text)
                                printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif      /* KSSL_DEBUG */
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                kssl_err.reason);
                        goto err;
                        }

            /*  Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
            **  but will return authtime == 0.
            */
            if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
                              &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
                  {
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                        printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
                                krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
                        if (kssl_err.text)
                                printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif      /* KSSL_DEBUG */
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                kssl_err.reason);
                        goto err;
                  }

            if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
                        goto err;
                  }

#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif      /* KSSL_DEBUG */

            enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
                if (enc == NULL)
                    goto err;

            memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);     /* per RFC 1510 */

            if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                  goto err;
                  }
            if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
                              (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                  goto err;
                  }
            if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto err;
                  }
            if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                  goto err;
                  }
            outl += padl;
            if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto err;
                  }
            if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
                {
                /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
                 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
                 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
                 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
                 * the protocol version.
                 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
                 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
                 */
                if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
                    {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
                  goto err;
                  }
                }

            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);

                s->session->master_key_length=
                        s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                s->session->master_key, pms, outl);

                if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
                        {
                        size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
                        if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
                                {
                                s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
                                memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
                                }
                        }


                /*  Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
            **  but it caused problems for apache.
                **  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
                **  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
                */
                }
      else
#endif      /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
            if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
            {
            int ret = 1;
            int field_size = 0;
            const EC_KEY   *tkey;
            const EC_GROUP *group;
            const BIGNUM *priv_key;

                /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
            if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto err;
                  }

            /* Let's get server private key and group information */
            if (l & SSL_kECDH) 
                  { 
                        /* use the certificate */
                  tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
                  }
            else
                  {
                  /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
                   * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
                   */
                  tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
                  }

            group    = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
            priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);

            if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
                !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                         ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                  goto err;
                  }

            /* Let's get client's public key */
            if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                      ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto err;
                  }

                if (n == 0L) 
                        {
                  /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */

                   if (l & SSL_kECDHE) 
                         {
                         al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
                         goto f_err;
                         }
                        if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
                      == NULL) || 
                      (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
                              {
                        /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
                         * authentication using ECDH certificates
                         * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
                         * never executed. When that support is
                         * added, we ought to ensure the key 
                         * received in the certificate is 
                         * authorized for key agreement.
                         * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
                         * the two ECDH shares are for the same
                         * group.
                         */
                              al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                            SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
                              goto f_err;
                              }

                  if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
                      EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                              ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }
                        ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
                        }
                else
                        {
                  /* Get client's public key from encoded point
                   * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
                   */
                  if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                            ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                        goto err;
                        }

                        /* Get encoded point length */
                        i = *p; 
                  p += 1;
                        if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 
                      clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                            ERR_R_EC_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }
                        /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
                         * currently, so set it to the start 
                         */ 
                        p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
                        }

            /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
            field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
            if (field_size <= 0)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
                         ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                  goto err;
                  }
            i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
                if (i <= 0)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                      ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                        goto err;
                        }

            EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
            EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
            if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
                  EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
            BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);

            /* Compute the master secret */
                s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
                generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
            
                OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
                return (ret);
            }
      else
#endif
            {
            al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
            goto f_err;
            }

      return(1);
f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
      EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
      EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
      if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
            EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
      BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
      return(-1);
      }

int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
      {
      EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
      unsigned char *p;
      int al,ok,ret=0;
      long n;
      int type=0,i,j;
      X509 *peer;

      n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
            SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
            SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
            -1,
            514, /* 514? */
            &ok);

      if (!ok) return((int)n);

      if (s->session->peer != NULL)
            {
            peer=s->session->peer;
            pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
            type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
            }
      else
            {
            peer=NULL;
            pkey=NULL;
            }

      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
            {
            s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
            if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            ret=1;
            goto end;
            }

      if (peer == NULL)
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
            al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
            goto f_err;
            }

      if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
            al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
            goto f_err;
            }

      if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
            al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
            goto f_err;
            }

      /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
      p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
      n2s(p,i);
      n-=2;
      if (i > n)
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
            al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
            goto f_err;
            }

      j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
      if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
            al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
            goto f_err;
            }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 
      if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
            {
            i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
                  MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 
                                          pkey->pkey.rsa);
            if (i < 0)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            if (i == 0)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }
      else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
            if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
            {
            j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
                  &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
                  SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
            if (j <= 0)
                  {
                  /* bad signature */
                  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }
      else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
            if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
            {
            j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
                  &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
                  SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
            if (j <= 0)
                  {
                  /* bad signature */
                  al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
                      SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }
      else
#endif
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
            goto f_err;
            }


      ret=1;
      if (0)
            {
f_err:
            ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
            }
end:
      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
      return(ret);
      }

int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
      {
      int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
      X509 *x=NULL;
      unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
      const unsigned char *p,*q;
      unsigned char *d;
      STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;

      n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
            SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
            SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
            -1,
            s->max_cert_list,
            &ok);

      if (!ok) return((int)n);

      if    (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
            {
            if (  (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
                  (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
                  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
            if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
                  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
            return(1);
            }

      if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
            {
            al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
            goto f_err;
            }
      p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

      if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            goto err;
            }

      n2l3(p,llen);
      if (llen+3 != n)
            {
            al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
            goto f_err;
            }
      for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
            {
            n2l3(p,l);
            if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                  goto f_err;
                  }

            q=p;
            x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
            if (x == NULL)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
                  goto err;
                  }
            if (p != (q+l))
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto err;
                  }
            x=NULL;
            nc+=l+3;
            }

      if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
            {
            /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
            if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
            else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
                   (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
                  al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }
      else
            {
            i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
            if (i <= 0)
                  {
                  al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }

      if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
            X509_free(s->session->peer);
      s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
      s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;

      /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
       * when we arrive here. */
      if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
            {
            s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
            if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto err;
                  }
            }
      if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
            sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
      s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
      /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
       * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */

      sk=NULL;

      ret=1;
      if (0)
            {
f_err:
            ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
            }
err:
      if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
      if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
      return(ret);
      }

int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
      {
      unsigned long l;
      X509 *x;

      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
            {
            x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
            if (x == NULL &&
                        /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
                        (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
                                & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
                        != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                  return(0);
                  }

            l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
            s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
            s->init_num=(int)l;
            s->init_off=0;
            }

      /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
      return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
      }


#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
      /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
       * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
      switch (nid) {
      case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
            return 1;
      case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
            return 2;
      case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
            return 3;
      case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
            return 4;
      case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
            return 5;
      case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
            return 6;
      case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
            return 7;
      case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
            return 8;
      case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
            return 9;
      case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
            return 10;
      case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
            return 11;
      case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
            return 12;
      case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
            return 13;
      case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
            return 14;
      case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
            return 15;
      case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
            return 16;
      case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
            return 17;
      case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
            return 18;
      case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
            return 19;
      case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
            return 20;
      case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
            return 21;
      case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
            return 22;
      case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
            return 23;
      case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
            return 24;
      case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */ 
            return 25;
      default:
            return 0;
      }
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
      {
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
            {
            unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
            int len, slen;
            unsigned int hlen;
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
            HMAC_CTX hctx;
            SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
            unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
            unsigned char key_name[16];

            /* get session encoding length */
            slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
            /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
             * too long
             */
            if (slen > 0xFF00)
                  return -1;
            /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
             * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
             * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
             * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
             * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
             * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
             */
            if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
                  26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
                  EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
                  return -1;
            senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
            if (!senc)
                  return -1;
            p = senc;
            i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);

            p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
            /* do the header */
            *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
            /* Skip message length for now */
            p += 3;
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
            HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
            /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
             * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
             * from parent ctx.
             */
            if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
                  {
                  if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
                                           &hctx, 1) < 0)
                        {
                        OPENSSL_free(senc);
                        return -1;
                        }
                  }
            else
                  {
                  RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
                  EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
                              tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
                  HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
                              tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
                  memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
                  }
            l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
            /* Skip ticket length for now */
            p += 2;
            /* Output key name */
            macstart = p;
            memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
            p += 16;
            /* output IV */
            memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
            p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
            /* Encrypt session data */
            EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
            p += len;
            EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
            p += len;
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);

            HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
            HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
            HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);

            p += hlen;
            /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
            /* Total length */
            len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
            p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
            l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
            p += 4;
            s2n(len - 10, p);  /* Ticket length */

            /* number of bytes to write */
            s->init_num= len;
            s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
            s->init_off=0;
            OPENSSL_free(senc);
            }

      /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
      return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
      }

int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
      {
      if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
            {
            unsigned char *p;
            /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
             * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
             * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
             * + (ocsp response)
             */
            if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
                  return -1;

            p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;

            /* do the header */
            *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
            /* message length */
            l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
            /* status type */
            *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
            /* length of OCSP response */
            l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
            /* actual response */
            memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
            /* number of bytes to write */
            s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
            s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
            s->init_off = 0;
            }

      /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
      return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
      }
#endif

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