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s3_pkt.c

/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define USE_SOCKETS
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>

static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
                   unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);

int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
      {
      /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
       * packet by another n bytes.
       * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
       * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
       * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
       * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
       */
      int i,off,newb;

      if (!extend)
            {
            /* start with empty packet ... */
            if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
                  s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
            s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
            s->packet_length = 0;
            /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
            }

      /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
       * because the read operation returns the whole packet
       * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
      if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
            {
            if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left)
                  n = s->s3->rbuf.left;
            }

      /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
      if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
            {
            s->packet_length+=n;
            s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
            s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
            return(n);
            }

      /* else we need to read more data */
      if (!s->read_ahead)
            max=n;

      {
            /* avoid buffer overflow */
            int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length;
            if (max > max_max)
                  max = max_max;
      }
      if (n > max) /* does not happen */
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            return -1;
            }

      off = s->packet_length;
      newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
      /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
       * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
       * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
      if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
            {
            /*  off > 0 */
            memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
            s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
            }

      while (newb < n)
            {
            /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
             * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */

            clear_sys_error();
            if (s->rbio != NULL)
                  {
                  s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
                  i=BIO_read(s->rbio,     &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
                  }
            else
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
                  i = -1;
                  }

            if (i <= 0)
                  {
                  s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
                  return(i);
                  }
            newb+=i;
            /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
             * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
             * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
            if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
                  {
                  if (n > newb)
                        n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */
                  }
            }

      /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
      s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
      s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
      s->packet_length += n;
      s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
      return(n);
      }

/* Call this to get a new input record.
 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
 * or non-blocking IO.
 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
 * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
 * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
 */
/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
      {
      int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
      int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
      SSL3_RECORD *rr;
      SSL_SESSION *sess;
      unsigned char *p;
      unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
      short version;
      unsigned int mac_size;
      int clear=0;
      size_t extra;
      int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
      unsigned char *mac = NULL;

      rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
      sess=s->session;

      if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
            extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
      else
            extra=0;
      if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
            {
            /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
             * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            return -1;
            }

again:
      /* check if we have the header */
      if (  (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
            (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
            {
            n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
            if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
            s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;

            p=s->packet;

            /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
            rr->type= *(p++);
            ssl_major= *(p++);
            ssl_minor= *(p++);
            version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
            n2s(p,rr->length);

            /* Lets check version */
            if (!s->first_packet)
                  {
                  if (version != s->version)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
                                    /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
                              s->version = (unsigned short)version;
                        al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                  }

            if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
                  goto err;
                  }

            if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto f_err;
                  }

            /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
            }

      /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */

      if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
            {
            /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
            i=rr->length;
            n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
            if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
            /* now n == rr->length,
             * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
            }

      s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */

      /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
       * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
       */
      rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);

      /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
       * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
       * need to be copied into rr->data by either
       * the decryption or by the decompression
       * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
       * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 

      /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
       * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */

      /* check is not needed I believe */
      if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
            {
            al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
            goto f_err;
            }

      /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
      rr->data=rr->input;

      enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
      if (enc_err <= 0)
            {
            if (enc_err == 0)
                  /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
                  goto err;

            /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
             * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
             * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
             * the MAC computation anyway. */
            decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
            }

#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif

      /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
      if (  (sess == NULL) ||
            (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
            (s->read_hash == NULL))
            clear=1;

      if (!clear)
            {
            mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);

            if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
                  {
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
                  al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto f_err;
#else
                  decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
#endif                  
                  }
            /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
            if (rr->length >= mac_size)
                  {
                  rr->length -= mac_size;
                  mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                  }
            else
                  {
                  /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
                  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                  goto f_err;
#else
                  decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
                  rr->length = 0;
#endif
                  }
            i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
            if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
                  {
                  decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
                  }
            }

      if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
            {
            /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
             * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
             * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
             * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
             * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
            al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
            goto f_err;
            }

      /* r->length is now just compressed */
      if (s->expand != NULL)
            {
            if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }

      if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
            {
            al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
            goto f_err;
            }

      rr->off=0;
      /* So at this point the following is true
       * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
       * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
       * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
       * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
       *                   after use :-).
       */

      /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
      s->packet_length=0;

      /* just read a 0 length packet */
      if (rr->length == 0) goto again;

      return(1);

f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
      return(ret);
      }

int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
      {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      int i;
      SSL3_RECORD *rr;

      rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
      i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
            SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
      if (i < 0)
            return(0);
      else
            rr->length=i;
      rr->data=rr->comp;
#endif
      return(1);
      }

int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
      {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
      int i;
      SSL3_RECORD *wr;

      wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
      i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
            SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
            wr->input,(int)wr->length);
      if (i < 0)
            return(0);
      else
            wr->length=i;

      wr->input=wr->data;
#endif
      return(1);
      }

/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
 */
int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
      {
      const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
      unsigned int tot,n,nw;
      int i;

      s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
      tot=s->s3->wnum;
      s->s3->wnum=0;

      if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
            {
            i=s->handshake_func(s);
            if (i < 0) return(i);
            if (i == 0)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                  return -1;
                  }
            }

      n=(len-tot);
      for (;;)
            {
            if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
                  nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
            else
                  nw=n;

            i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
            if (i <= 0)
                  {
                  s->s3->wnum=tot;
                  return i;
                  }

            if ((i == (int)n) ||
                  (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
                   (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
                  {
                  /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
                   * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
                  s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
                  
                  return tot+i;
                  }

            n-=i;
            tot+=i;
            }
      }

static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
                   unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
      {
      unsigned char *p,*plen;
      int i,mac_size,clear=0;
      int prefix_len = 0;
      SSL3_RECORD *wr;
      SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
      SSL_SESSION *sess;

      /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
       * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
      if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
            return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));

      /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
      if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
            {
            i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
            if (i <= 0)
                  return(i);
            /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
            }

      if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
            return 0;

      wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
      wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
      sess=s->session;

      if (  (sess == NULL) ||
            (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
            (s->write_hash == NULL))
            clear=1;

      if (clear)
            mac_size=0;
      else
            mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);

      /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
      if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
            {
            /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
             * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */

            if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
                  {
                  /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
                   * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
                   * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
                   * together with the actual payload) */
                  prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
                  if (prefix_len <= 0)
                        goto err;

                  if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
                        {
                        /* insufficient space */
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        goto err;
                        }
                  }
            
            s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
            }

      p = wb->buf + prefix_len;

      /* write the header */

      *(p++)=type&0xff;
      wr->type=type;

      *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
      *(p++)=s->version&0xff;

      /* field where we are to write out packet length */
      plen=p; 
      p+=2;

      /* lets setup the record stuff. */
      wr->data=p;
      wr->length=(int)len;
      wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;

      /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
       * wr->data */

      /* first we compress */
      if (s->compress != NULL)
            {
            if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
                  goto err;
                  }
            }
      else
            {
            memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
            wr->input=wr->data;
            }

      /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
       * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
       * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */

      if (mac_size != 0)
            {
            s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
            wr->length+=mac_size;
            wr->input=p;
            wr->data=p;
            }

      /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
      s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);

      /* record length after mac and block padding */
      s2n(wr->length,plen);

      /* we should now have
       * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
       * wr->length long */
      wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
      wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;

      if (create_empty_fragment)
            {
            /* we are in a recursive call;
             * just return the length, don't write out anything here
             */
            return wr->length;
            }

      /* now let's set up wb */
      wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
      wb->offset = 0;

      /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
      s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
      s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
      s->s3->wpend_type=type;
      s->s3->wpend_ret=len;

      /* we now just need to write the buffer */
      return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
err:
      return -1;
      }

/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
      unsigned int len)
      {
      int i;

/* XXXX */
      if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
            || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
                  !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
            || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
            return(-1);
            }

      for (;;)
            {
            clear_sys_error();
            if (s->wbio != NULL)
                  {
                  s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
                  i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
                        (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
                        (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
                  }
            else
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
                  i= -1;
                  }
            if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
                  {
                  s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
                  s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
                  return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
                  }
            else if (i <= 0) {
                  if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
                      s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
                        /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
                           point in using a datagram service */
                        s->s3->wbuf.left = 0;
                  }
                  return(i);
            }
            s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
            s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
            }
      }

/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
 * 'type' is one of the following:
 *
 *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
 *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
 *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
 *
 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
 *
 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
 *     Change cipher spec protocol
 *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
 *     Alert protocol
 *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
 *     Handshake protocol
 *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
 *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
 *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
 *     Application data protocol
 *             none of our business
 */
int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
      {
      int al,i,j,ret;
      unsigned int n;
      SSL3_RECORD *rr;
      void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;

      if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
            if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
                  return(-1);

      if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
          (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
            {
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            return -1;
            }

      if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
            /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
            {
            unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
            unsigned char *dst = buf;
            unsigned int k;

            /* peek == 0 */
            n = 0;
            while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
                  {
                  *dst++ = *src++;
                  len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
                  n++;
                  }
            /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
            for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
                  s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
            return n;
      }

      /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */

      if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
            {
            /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
            i=s->handshake_func(s);
            if (i < 0) return(i);
            if (i == 0)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                  return(-1);
                  }
            }
start:
      s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;

      /* s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
       * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
       * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
       * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
      rr = &(s->s3->rrec);

      /* get new packet if necessary */
      if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
            {
            ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
            if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
            }

      /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */

      if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
                                     * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
            && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
            {
            al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
            goto f_err;
            }

      /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
       * (even in 'peek' mode) */
      if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
            {
            rr->length=0;
            s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
            return(0);
            }


      if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
            {
            /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
             * are doing a handshake for the first time */
            if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
                  (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
                  goto f_err;
                  }

            if (len <= 0) return(len);

            if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
                  n = rr->length;
            else
                  n = (unsigned int)len;

            memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
            if (!peek)
                  {
                  rr->length-=n;
                  rr->off+=n;
                  if (rr->length == 0)
                        {
                        s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
                        rr->off=0;
                        }
                  }
            return(n);
            }


      /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
       * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */

      /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
       * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
       */
            {
            unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
            unsigned char *dest = NULL;
            unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;

            if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
                  {
                  dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
                  dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
                  dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
                  }
            else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
                  {
                  dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
                  dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
                  dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
                  }

            if (dest_maxlen > 0)
                  {
                  n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
                  if (rr->length < n)
                        n = rr->length; /* available bytes */

                  /* now move 'n' bytes: */
                  while (n-- > 0)
                        {
                        dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
                        rr->length--;
                        }

                  if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
                        goto start; /* fragment was too small */
                  }
            }

      /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
       * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
       * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */

      /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
      if ((!s->server) &&
            (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
            (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
            (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
            {
            s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;

            if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
                  (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
                  (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
                  goto f_err;
                  }

            if (s->msg_callback)
                  s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

            if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
                  !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
                  !s->s3->renegotiate)
                  {
                  ssl3_renegotiate(s);
                  if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
                        {
                        i=s->handshake_func(s);
                        if (i < 0) return(i);
                        if (i == 0)
                              {
                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                              return(-1);
                              }

                        if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
                              {
                              if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
                                    {
                                    BIO *bio;
                                    /* In the case where we try to read application data,
                                     * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
                                     * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
                                     * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
                                    s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
                                    bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
                                    BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
                                    BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
                                    return(-1);
                                    }
                              }
                        }
                  }
            /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
             * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
            goto start;
            }
      /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
       * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
       * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
       */
      if (s->server &&
            SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
            !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
            (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
            (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
            (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
            (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
            !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
            
            {
            /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
            rr->length = 0;
            ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
            goto start;
            }
      if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
            {
            int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
            int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];

            s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;

            if (s->msg_callback)
                  s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

            if (s->info_callback != NULL)
                  cb=s->info_callback;
            else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
                  cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

            if (cb != NULL)
                  {
                  j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
                  cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
                  }

            if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
                  {
                  s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
                  if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
                        {
                        s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
                        return(0);
                        }
                  /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
                   * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
                   * a fatal alert because if application tried to
                   * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
                   * expects it to succeed.
                   *
                   * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
                   * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
                   */
                  else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
                        {
                        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                  }
            else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
                  {
                  char tmp[16];

                  s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
                  s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
                  BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
                  ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
                  s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
                  SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
                  return(0);
                  }
            else
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
                  goto f_err;
                  }

            goto start;
            }

      if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
            {
            s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
            rr->length=0;
            return(0);
            }

      if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
            {
            /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
             * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
            if (  (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
                  (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
                  goto f_err;
                  }

            /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
            if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
                  goto f_err;
                  }

            rr->length=0;

            if (s->msg_callback)
                  s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

            s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
            if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
                  goto err;
            else
                  goto start;
            }

      /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
      if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&     !s->in_handshake)
            {
            if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
                  !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
                  {
#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
       * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
       * protocol violations): */
                  s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
                        ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
                        :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#else
                  s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#endif
                  s->new_session=1;
                  }
            i=s->handshake_func(s);
            if (i < 0) return(i);
            if (i == 0)
                  {
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
                  return(-1);
                  }

            if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
                  {
                  if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
                        {
                        BIO *bio;
                        /* In the case where we try to read application data,
                         * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
                         * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
                         * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
                        s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
                        bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
                        BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
                        BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
                        return(-1);
                        }
                  }
            goto start;
            }

      switch (rr->type)
            {
      default:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
            /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
            if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
                  {
                  rr->length = 0;
                  goto start;
                  }
#endif
            al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
            goto f_err;
      case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
      case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
      case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
            /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
             * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
             * should not happen when type != rr->type */
            al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            goto f_err;
      case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
            /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
             * but have application data.  If the library was
             * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
             * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
             * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
             * we will indulge it.
             */
            if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
                  (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
                  ((
                        (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
                        (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
                        (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
                        ) || (
                              (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
                              (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
                              (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
                              )
                        ))
                  {
                  s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
                  return(-1);
                  }
            else
                  {
                  al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
                  goto f_err;
                  }
            }
      /* not reached */

f_err:
      ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
      return(-1);
      }

int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
      {
      int i;
      const char *sender;
      int slen;

      if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
            i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
      else
            i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;

      if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
            {
            if (s->session == NULL) 
                  {
                  /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
                  SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
                  return (0);
                  }

            s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
            }

      if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
            return(0);

      /* we have to record the message digest at
       * this point so we can get it before we read
       * the finished message */
      if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
            {
            sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
            slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
            }
      else
            {
            sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
            slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
            }

      s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
            &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
            &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
            sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);

      return(1);
      }

int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
      {
      /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
      desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
      if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
            desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
      if (desc < 0) return -1;
      /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
      if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
            SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);

      s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
      s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
      s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
      if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
            return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
      /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
       * some time in the future */
      return -1;
      }

int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
      {
      int i,j;
      void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;

      s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
      i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
      if (i <= 0)
            {
            s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
            }
      else
            {
            /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
             * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
             * we will not worry too much. */
            if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
                  (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);

            if (s->msg_callback)
                  s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);

            if (s->info_callback != NULL)
                  cb=s->info_callback;
            else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
                  cb=s->ctx->info_callback;

            if (cb != NULL)
                  {
                  j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
                  cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
                  }
            }
      return(i);
      }

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