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x509_vfy.c

/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>

#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>

static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;


static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
      {
      return ok;
      }

#if 0
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
      {
      return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
      }
#endif

int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
      X509_NAME *xn;
      int bad_chain = 0;
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
      int depth,i,ok=0;
      int num;
      int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
      STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
      if (ctx->cert == NULL)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
            return -1;
            }

      cb=ctx->verify_cb;

      /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
       * present and that the first entry is in place */
      if (ctx->chain == NULL)
            {
            if (  ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
                  (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
                  {
                  X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  goto end;
                  }
            CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
            ctx->last_untrusted=1;
            }

      /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
      if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
          && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            goto end;
            }

      num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
      x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
      depth=param->depth;


      for (;;)
            {
            /* If we have enough, we break */
            if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
                                     * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
                                     * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
                                     * code later.
                                     */

            /* If we are self signed, we break */
            xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
            if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;

            /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
            if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
                  {
                  xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
                  if (xtmp != NULL)
                        {
                        if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
                              {
                              X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                              goto end;
                              }
                        CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                        sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
                        ctx->last_untrusted++;
                        x=xtmp;
                        num++;
                        /* reparse the full chain for
                         * the next one */
                        continue;
                        }
                  }
            break;
            }

      /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
       * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
       * if possible, otherwise we complain. */

      /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
       * is self signed.
       */

      i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
      x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
      xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
      if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
            {
            /* we have a self signed certificate */
            if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
                  {
                  /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
                   * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
                   * match to avoid possible impersonation.
                   */
                  ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
                  if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
                        ctx->current_cert=x;
                        ctx->error_depth=i-1;
                        if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
                        bad_chain = 1;
                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto end;
                        }
                  else 
                        {
                        /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
                         * so we get any trust settings.
                         */
                        X509_free(x);
                        x = xtmp;
                        sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
                        ctx->last_untrusted=0;
                        }
                  }
            else
                  {
                  /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
                  chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                  ctx->last_untrusted--;
                  num--;
                  x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
                  }
            }

      /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
      for (;;)
            {
            /* If we have enough, we break */
            if (depth < num) break;

            /* If we are self signed, we break */
            xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
            if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;

            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);

            if (ok < 0) return ok;
            if (ok == 0) break;

            x = xtmp;
            if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
                  {
                  X509_free(xtmp);
                  X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                  return 0;
                  }
            num++;
            }

      /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
      xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);

      /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
      if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
            {
            if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
                  {
                  if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
                  else
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
                  ctx->current_cert=x;
                  }
            else
                  {

                  sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
                  num++;
                  ctx->last_untrusted=num;
                  ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
                  ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
                  chain_ss=NULL;
                  }

            ctx->error_depth=num-1;
            bad_chain = 1;
            ok=cb(0,ctx);
            if (!ok) goto end;
            }

      /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
      ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);

      if (!ok) goto end;

      /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */

      if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);

      if (!ok) goto end;

      /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
      X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);

      /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
       * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
       */

      ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
      if(!ok) goto end;

      /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
      if (ctx->verify != NULL)
            ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
      else
            ok=internal_verify(ctx);
      if(!ok) goto end;

      /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
      if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
            ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
      if(!ok) goto end;
      if (0)
            {
end:
            X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
            }
      if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
      if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
      return ok;
      }


/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
 */

static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
      int i;
      X509 *issuer;
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
            {
            issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
            if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
                  return issuer;
            }
      return NULL;
}

/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */

static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
      int ret;
      ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
      if (ret == X509_V_OK)
            return 1;
      /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
      if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
            return 0;

      ctx->error = ret;
      ctx->current_cert = x;
      ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
      return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
      return 0;
}

/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */

static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
      *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
      if (*issuer)
            {
            CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
            return 1;
            }
      else
            return 0;
}
      

/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
 * with the supplied purpose
 */

static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
      return 1;
#else
      int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
      X509 *x;
      int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
      int proxy_path_length = 0;
      int allow_proxy_certs =
            !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
      cb=ctx->verify_cb;

      /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
         -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
             use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
         0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
             used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
         1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
             all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
      */
      must_be_ca = -1;

      /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
         happy */
      if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
            allow_proxy_certs = 1;

      /* Check all untrusted certificates */
      for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
            {
            int ret;
            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
            if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
                  && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
                  {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
                  ctx->error_depth = i;
                  ctx->current_cert = x;
                  ok=cb(0,ctx);
                  if (!ok) goto end;
                  }
            if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
                  {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
                  ctx->error_depth = i;
                  ctx->current_cert = x;
                  ok=cb(0,ctx);
                  if (!ok) goto end;
                  }
            ret = X509_check_ca(x);
            switch(must_be_ca)
                  {
            case -1:
                  if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                        && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
                        {
                        ret = 0;
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
                        }
                  else
                        ret = 1;
                  break;
            case 0:
                  if (ret != 0)
                        {
                        ret = 0;
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
                        }
                  else
                        ret = 1;
                  break;
            default:
                  if ((ret == 0)
                        || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                              && (ret != 1)))
                        {
                        ret = 0;
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
                        }
                  else
                        ret = 1;
                  break;
                  }
            if (ret == 0)
                  {
                  ctx->error_depth = i;
                  ctx->current_cert = x;
                  ok=cb(0,ctx);
                  if (!ok) goto end;
                  }
            if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
                  {
                  ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
                        must_be_ca > 0);
                  if ((ret == 0)
                        || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                              && (ret != 1)))
                        {
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
                        ctx->error_depth = i;
                        ctx->current_cert = x;
                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto end;
                        }
                  }
            /* Check pathlen */
            if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
                     && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
                  {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
                  ctx->error_depth = i;
                  ctx->current_cert = x;
                  ok=cb(0,ctx);
                  if (!ok) goto end;
                  }
            /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
               certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
               certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
               CA certificate.  */
            if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
                  {
                  if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
                        {
                        ctx->error =
                              X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
                        ctx->error_depth = i;
                        ctx->current_cert = x;
                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto end;
                        }
                  proxy_path_length++;
                  must_be_ca = 0;
                  }
            else
                  must_be_ca = 1;
            }
      ok = 1;
 end:
      return ok;
#endif
}

static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
      return 1;
#else
      int i, ok;
      X509 *x;
      int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
      cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
      i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
      x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
      ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
      if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
            return 1;
      ctx->error_depth = i;
      ctx->current_cert = x;
      if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
      else
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
      ok = cb(0, ctx);
      return ok;
#endif
}

static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      int i, last, ok;
      if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
            return 1;
      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
            last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
      else
            last = 0;
      for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
            {
            ctx->error_depth = i;
            ok = check_cert(ctx);
            if (!ok) return ok;
            }
      return 1;
      }

static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
      X509 *x;
      int ok, cnum;
      cnum = ctx->error_depth;
      x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
      ctx->current_cert = x;
      /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
      ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
      /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
       * notify callback
       */
      if(!ok)
            {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
            goto err;
            }
      ctx->current_crl = crl;
      ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
      if (!ok) goto err;
      ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
      err:
      ctx->current_crl = NULL;
      X509_CRL_free(crl);
      return ok;

      }

/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */

static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
      {
      time_t *ptime;
      int i;
      ctx->current_crl = crl;
      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
            ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
      else
            ptime = NULL;

      i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
      if (i == 0)
            {
            ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
            if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
            }

      if (i > 0)
            {
            ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
            if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
            }

      if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
            {
            i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);

            if (i == 0)
                  {
                  ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
                  if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                  }

            if (i < 0)
                  {
                  ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
                  if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                  }
            }

      ctx->current_crl = NULL;

      return 1;
      }

/* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
 * was invalid.
 */

static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
                  X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
      {
      int i;
      X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
            {
            crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
            if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
                  continue;
            if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
                  {
                  *pcrl = crl;
                  CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                  return 1;
                  }
            best_crl = crl;
            }
      if (best_crl)
            {
            *pcrl = best_crl;
            CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
            }
            
      return 0;
      }

/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
 */
static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
      {
      int ok;
      X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
      X509_OBJECT xobj;
      X509_NAME *nm;
      nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
      ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
      if (ok)
            {
            *pcrl = crl;
            return 1;
            }

      ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);

      if (!ok)
            {
            /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
            if (crl)
                  {
                  *pcrl = crl;
                  return 1;
                  }
            return 0;
            }

      *pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
      if (crl)
            X509_CRL_free(crl);
      return 1;
      }

/* Check CRL validity */
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
      {
      X509 *issuer = NULL;
      EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
      int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
      cnum = ctx->error_depth;
      chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
      /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
       * is next certificate in chain.
       */
      if(cnum < chnum)
            issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
      else
            {
            issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
            /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
            if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
                  {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if(!ok) goto err;
                  }
            }

      if(issuer)
            {
            /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
            if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
                  !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
                  {
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if(!ok) goto err;
                  }

            /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
            ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);

            if(!ikey)
                  {
                  ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if (!ok) goto err;
                  }
            else
                  {
                  /* Verify CRL signature */
                  if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
                        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto err;
                        }
                  }
            }

      ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
      if (!ok)
            goto err;

      ok = 1;

      err:
      EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
      return ok;
      }

/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
      {
      int idx, ok;
      X509_REVOKED rtmp;
      STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
      X509_EXTENSION *ext;
      /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
      rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
      /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
       * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
       */
      if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
            {
            CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
            sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
            CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
            }
      idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
      /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
       * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
       */
      if(idx >= 0)
            {
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
            if (!ok) return 0;
            }

      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
            return 1;

      /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
       * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
       * rejected. 
       * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
       * shouldn't do this.
       */

      exts = crl->crl->extensions;

      for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
            {
            ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
            if (ext->critical > 0)
                  {
                  ctx->error =
                        X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
                  ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  if(!ok) return 0;
                  break;
                  }
            }
      return 1;
      }

static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      int ret;
      ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
                        ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
      if (ret == 0)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            return 0;
            }
      /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
      if (ret == -1)
            {
            /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
             * callback.
             */
            X509 *x;
            int i;
            for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
                  {
                  x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
                  if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
                        continue;
                  ctx->current_cert = x;
                  ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
                  ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                  }
            return 1;
            }
      if (ret == -2)
            {
            ctx->current_cert = NULL;
            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
            return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
            }

      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
            {
            ctx->current_cert = NULL;
            ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
            if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
                  return 0;
            }

      return 1;
      }

static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
      {
      time_t *ptime;
      int i;

      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
            ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
      else
            ptime = NULL;

      i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
      if (i == 0)
            {
            ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
            ctx->current_cert=x;
            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
            }

      if (i > 0)
            {
            ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
            ctx->current_cert=x;
            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
            }

      i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
      if (i == 0)
            {
            ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
            ctx->current_cert=x;
            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
            }

      if (i < 0)
            {
            ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
            ctx->current_cert=x;
            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                  return 0;
            }

      return 1;
      }

static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      int ok=0,n;
      X509 *xs,*xi;
      EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
      int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);

      cb=ctx->verify_cb;

      n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
      ctx->error_depth=n-1;
      n--;
      xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);

      if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
            xs=xi;
      else
            {
            if (n <= 0)
                  {
                  ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
                  ctx->current_cert=xi;
                  ok=cb(0,ctx);
                  goto end;
                  }
            else
                  {
                  n--;
                  ctx->error_depth=n;
                  xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
                  }
            }

/*    ctx->error=0;  not needed */
      while (n >= 0)
            {
            ctx->error_depth=n;
            if (!xs->valid)
                  {
                  if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
                        ctx->current_cert=xi;
                        ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto end;
                        }
                  else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
                        /* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
                         * this is a waste of time.  That check should
                         * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
                         * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
                         * we don't verify again and again in SSL
                         * handshakes and the like once the cert has
                         * been declared trusted. */
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
                        ctx->current_cert=xs;
                        ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok)
                              {
                              EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
                              goto end;
                              }
                        }
                  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
                  pkey=NULL;
                  }

            xs->valid = 1;

            ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
            if (!ok)
                  goto end;

            /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
            ctx->current_issuer=xi;
            ctx->current_cert=xs;
            ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
            if (!ok) goto end;

            n--;
            if (n >= 0)
                  {
                  xi=xs;
                  xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
                  }
            }
      ok=1;
end:
      return ok;
      }

int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
      return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}

int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
      {
      char *str;
      ASN1_TIME atm;
      long offset;
      char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
      int i,j;

      p=buff1;
      i=ctm->length;
      str=(char *)ctm->data;
      if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
            {
            if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
            memcpy(p,str,10);
            p+=10;
            str+=10;
            }
      else
            {
            if (i < 13) return 0;
            memcpy(p,str,12);
            p+=12;
            str+=12;
            }

      if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
            { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
      else
            { 
            *(p++)= *(str++);
            *(p++)= *(str++);
            /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
            if (*str == '.')
                  {
                  str++;
                  while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
                  }
            
            }
      *(p++)='Z';
      *(p++)='\0';

      if (*str == 'Z')
            offset=0;
      else
            {
            if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
                  return 0;
            offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
            offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
            if (*str == '-')
                  offset= -offset;
            }
      atm.type=ctm->type;
      atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
      atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;

      if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
            return 0;

      if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
            {
            i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
            if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
            j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
            if (j < 50) j+=100;

            if (i < j) return -1;
            if (i > j) return 1;
            }
      i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
      if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
            return -1;
      else
            return i;
      }

ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
{
      return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
}

ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
      {
      time_t t;
      int type = -1;

      if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
      else time(&t);

      t+=adj;
      if (s) type = s->type;
      if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
      if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
      return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
      }

int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
      {
      EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
      int i,j;

      if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;

      for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
            {
            ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
            if (ktmp == NULL)
                  {
                  X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
                  return 0;
                  }
            if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
                  break;
            else
                  {
                  EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
                  ktmp=NULL;
                  }
            }
      if (ktmp == NULL)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
            return 0;
            }

      /* first, populate the other certs */
      for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
            {
            ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
            EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
            EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
            }
      
      if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
      EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
      return 1;
      }

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
           CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
      {
      /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
       * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
      return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
                  new_func, dup_func, free_func);
      }

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
      {
      return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
      }

void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
      {
      return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
      }

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      return ctx->error;
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
      {
      ctx->error=err;
      }

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      return ctx->error_depth;
      }

X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      return ctx->current_cert;
      }

STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      return ctx->chain;
      }

STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      int i;
      X509 *x;
      STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
      if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
      for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
            {
            x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
            CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
            }
      return chain;
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
      {
      ctx->cert=x;
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
      {
      ctx->untrusted=sk;
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
      {
      ctx->crls=sk;
      }

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
      {
      return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
      }

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
      {
      return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
      }

/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
 */

int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
                        int purpose, int trust)
{
      int idx;
      /* If purpose not set use default */
      if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
      /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
      if (purpose)
            {
            X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
            if (idx == -1)
                  {
                  X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
                                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
                  return 0;
                  }
            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
            if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
                  {
                  idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
                  if (idx == -1)
                        {
                        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
                                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
                        return 0;
                        }
                  ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
                  }
            /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
            if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
            }
      if (trust)
            {
            idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
            if (idx == -1)
                  {
                  X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
                                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
                  return 0;
                  }
            }

      if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
      if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
      return 1;
}

X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
{
      X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
      ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
      if (!ctx)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            return NULL;
            }
      memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
      return ctx;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
      X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
      OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
           STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
      {
      int ret = 1;
      ctx->ctx=store;
      ctx->current_method=0;
      ctx->cert=x509;
      ctx->untrusted=chain;
      ctx->crls = NULL;
      ctx->last_untrusted=0;
      ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
      ctx->valid=0;
      ctx->chain=NULL;
      ctx->error=0;
      ctx->explicit_policy=0;
      ctx->error_depth=0;
      ctx->current_cert=NULL;
      ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
      ctx->tree = NULL;

      ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();

      if (!ctx->param)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            return 0;
            }

      /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
       * use defaults.
       */


      if (store)
            ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
      else
            ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;

      if (store)
            {
            ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
            ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
            }
      else
            ctx->cleanup = 0;

      if (ret)
            ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
                              X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));

      if (ret == 0)
            {
            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            return 0;
            }

      if (store && store->check_issued)
            ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
      else
            ctx->check_issued = check_issued;

      if (store && store->get_issuer)
            ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
      else
            ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;

      if (store && store->verify_cb)
            ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
      else
            ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;

      if (store && store->verify)
            ctx->verify = store->verify;
      else
            ctx->verify = internal_verify;

      if (store && store->check_revocation)
            ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
      else
            ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;

      if (store && store->get_crl)
            ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
      else
            ctx->get_crl = get_crl;

      if (store && store->check_crl)
            ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
      else
            ctx->check_crl = check_crl;

      if (store && store->cert_crl)
            ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
      else
            ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;

      ctx->check_policy = check_policy;


      /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
       * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
       * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
      /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
      if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
                        &(ctx->ex_data)))
            {
            OPENSSL_free(ctx);
            X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
            return 0;
            }
      return 1;
      }

/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
 */

void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
      ctx->other_ctx = sk;
      ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
      if (ctx->tree)
            X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
      if (ctx->chain != NULL)
            {
            sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
            ctx->chain=NULL;
            }
      CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
      memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
      {
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
      {
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
      {
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                          int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
      {
      ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
      }

X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      return ctx->tree;
      }

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      return ctx->explicit_policy;
      }

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
      {
      const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
      param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
      if (!param)
            return 0;
      return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
      }

X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      {
      return ctx->param;
      }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
      {
      if (ctx->param)
            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
      ctx->param = param;
      }

IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)

IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)

IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)

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